- What does Russell mean by "sense data" and why does he introduce this notion?
Russel means to differentiate the act of sensing (the experience we have when smelling, hearing, etc.) and the result of said act. The result of this is the sense-data - what is the color, how does it smell, and so forth. Fundamentally, Russel aims to investigate how we perceive and ultimately define “physical objects”. “Is there any such thing as matter?”, he asks. But the true goal I feel is to introduce Descartes’ system of “methodical doubt”, where scepticism is used to invites us all to view things in a new light.
- What is the meaning of the terms "proposition" and "statement of fact"? How does propositions and statement of facts differ from other kinds of verbal expressions?
A statement of fact is a proposition that is commonly agreed upon amongst peers, sometimes erroneously. Different social groups may have conflicting perceptions of facts, take for example religious Creationists in the U.S. who reject evolution. Russel writes about empirical knowledge, and how experience and sense-data make up what we today may propose to be a fact, and later accepted as one. Propositions are, in turn, made up by data (be it historical knowledge or sensor-data) from acquaintances to matters or simply a description of an object or abstract idea. In all, a proposition is required to include constituents that we are acquainted with, according to Russel.
In the modern scientific society we live in today, the (indirect) consensus from scientific observation is that a proposition constitutes for a statement of fact once it has been tested and thoroughly analyzed from the scientific community. One could argue, however, about who is given the mandate of credibility, and what impact this has on “statement of fact”?
- In chapter 5 ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description") Russell introduces the notion "definite description". What does this notion mean?
When describing objects - or propositions, for that matter - one can talk about ambiguous and definite descriptions, according to Russel. In regards to physical objects, sensor-data and description by acquaintances is what gives our perception strength, but when looking at non-physical objects one must more finely tune the very definition of the object itself. It is therefore of value to look at a more definite description of said object, in singular, to minimize the presence of ambiguity.
- In chapter 13 ("Knowledge, Error and Probable Opinion") and in chapter 14 ("The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge") Russell attacks traditional problems in theory of knowledge (epistemology). What are the main points in Russell's presentation?
Argues that our perceived knowledge may be based on either false or true beliefs, and that neither is true. He mentions the example of a newspaper announcing the death of a king, but what if the newspaper simply lied? That would be categorized as a false belief, resulting in no knowledge.
Russel means that because of this, self evidence needs to play a critical part where the sense-data is gradable in terms of truthfulness. Thus, he draws the conclusion that since knowledge needs to be inferred from self evidence or intuitive knowledge, the majority of what we today call knowledge is simply probable opinion. Russel further argues that since knowledge or science is based on agreeing on these kinds of individual probable opinions in larger masses, ideas that are based on probable opinion (or propositions, or theories) can never "transform [it] into indubitable knowledge”.
Hej Oskar!
SvaraRaderaI believe that you are on the right track when questioning who has the authority to decide about the truth of a statement of fact. "One could argue, however, about who is given the mandate of credibility, and what impact this has on “statement of fact”? "
I had some difficulty to understand the definition of "statement of fact" and found a really great lecture by Bertrand Russell himself on a website.
Russell expains it like this:
"Facts and Propositions" (1918-1919) “Gravitation varies inversely as the square of the distance,” my statement is rendered true by astronomical fact. If I say, “Two and two are four,” it is arithmetical fact that makes my statements true. On the other hand, if I say “Socrates is alive,” or “Gravitation varies directly as the distance,” or “Two and two are five,” the very same facts which made my previous statements true show that these new statements are false”.
So, whether the fact is true or not is not important, it is the action of making a statement of fact on something that he is making a definition of.